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LOYOLA LAW REVIEW
Volume 27, Number 4, Fall 1981

ARTICLES

ANALYTICAL AND COMPARATIVE VARIATIONS ON
SELECTED PROVISIONS OF BOOK ONE OF THE
LOUISIANA CIVIL CODE WITH SPECIAL
CONSIDERATION OF THE ROLE OF FAULT IN THE
DETERMINATION OF MARITAL DISPUTES
Thomas E. Carbonneau*

INTRODUCTION
This article is intended to be a type of "structuralist"I corn* An Associate Professor of Law at Tulane University School of Law, and Assistant
Director of the Eason-Weinmann Center of Comparative Law, the author holds the Dipl6me
Sup6rieur d'Etudes Fran*aises from the Universitk de Poitiers (1971), the A.B. from Bowdoin College (1972), the B.A. from St. John's College of Oxford University, where he was a
Rhodes Scholar (1975); the J.D. from the University of Virginia (1978); M.A. degrees from
Oxford University (1979) and the University of Virginia (1979); and the LL.M. from Columbia University (1979).
1. The adjective "structuralist" is borrowed from linguistic and literary theory and
generally refers to the Sausurrian concept of structuralism-that a literary text or a particular language, although representative of history on a diachronic axis, can be considered independently of historical developments on a synchronic axis (according to the now-celebrated
metaphor of the chess board). This general and admittedly simplistic definition of structuralism adequately characterizes the basic methodology used in this commentary. The language of Book I is separated from its historical evolution for the most part; the codal provisions are isolated and taken as an organic whole. The refinements of the decisional law are
integrated into the commentary wherever relevant. The commentary also includes a comparative reference: where appropriate, the Louisiana law of Persons is contrasted with its
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mentary upon selected provisions in Book I of the Louisiana Civil
Code. Its sole purpose is to illustrate, both for pedagogical and
doctrinal reasons, some of the analytical difficulties to which these
codal provisions might give rise when they are read in a close textual fashion. It should be emphasized that this study is a textual
commentary and not a historical assessment of the sources or origins of the codal texts-the latter analysis is outside the purview of
the present endeavor.
Accordingly, this article consists of a critical textual evaluation
of the relevant codal provisions of Book I of the Louisiana Civil
Code, emphasizing internal inconsistencies, ambiguities, and inequities which point to a need for legislative reconsideration and redrafting. For example, it is difficult from a reading of Book I to
identify the actual impediments to marriage. In addition, the provisions relating to putative marriage appear to lead, in certain circumstances, to an easily resolvable injustice to children born of
such unions. Moreover, the first book of the Code contains outmoded provisions, such as article 120, which no longer reflect contemporary conceptions about the role of men and women in marriage.
Articles 138, 141, and 160 establish the primacy of fault in regulating marital breakdowns and their financial consequences; it is submitted that, upon a close examination of the codal provisions and
the applicable jurisprudence, the role of fault not only is ill-defined
but also needs to be reevaluated in light of the evolution of mores
and the emergence of trends in other civilian jurisdictions. Finally,
the issue of legitimacy and the presumption of paternity in article
184 are analyzed for their possible gender-based discriminatory
effect.
The gravamen of this article is not to advocate a particular
view of marriage or of the role of a fault analysis in the breakdown
of marriage, but rather to begin an inquiry into the structural and
substantive cohesion of Book I of the Code. The language of article
138 makes the dissolution of marriage a reality; the question remains, however, whether the state, in the exercise of its legitimate
regulatory power in this area, has articulated a set of norms which
continue to be viable in contemporary society. While moral, religious, and psychological perceptions of marriage may conflict, it is
incumbent upon the legislature to arrive at a workable reconciliation of these values by elaborating a set of coherent guiding
analogue in other civilian jurisdictions, most notably France.
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principles.
THE IMPEDIMENTS TO MARRIAGE
The Evident Impediments
Louisiana Civil Code article 88 provides that lawful marriages
are those which "are contracted between a man and a woman and
solemnized according to the rules which the law prescribes."' Despite the fact that marriage in Louisiana is seen "in no other view
than as a civil contract,"' the state nonetheless, because of the social importance of marriage and the family, retains a prescriptive
authority which impinges upon the notion of freedom of contract
and the autonomy of the parties to establish the terms of their
agreement. 4 But, what are, under Louisiana law, the impediments
to the formation of this social contract between individuals?
The language of article 885 appears to prohibit homosexual
marriage; under this provision, the conjugal bond can be established only between parties of different sex, "between a man and a
woman." ' Article 93 seems to provide for an equally unambiguous
impediment. "Persons legally married are, until a*dissolution of
marriage, incapable of contracting another ....
Although questions will arise as to what constitutes a legally dissolved marriage,
it is undeniable that a person who is already married cannot legally
enter into another marriage until the previous marriage has been
dissolved. Finally, Louisiana Civil Code article 94 outlines in a
straightforward fashion the impediment to direct line relationships: "Marriage between persons related to each other in the direct ascending or descending line is prohibited."8 The clarity of the
Code, however, appears to end here; arguably, there are no other
impediments under Louisiana law to forming valid marriages.
'-

2.

LA. CiV. CODE ANN. art. 88 (West Supp. 1982).

3.
4.

Id. art. 86 (West 1952).
See, e.g., R. PASCAL, LOUISIANA

5.

See note 2 supra and accompanying text.

FAMILY LAW COURSE 1-34 (1979).

6. LA. CIv. CODE ANN. art. 88 (West Supp. 1982). A problem may arise here, however,
in relation to the marriage of a transsexual. On the transsexual issue, see Holloway,
Transsexuals-TheirLegal Sex, 40 U. COLO. L. REv. 282 (1968).
7.
8.

LA. Civ. CODE ANN. art. 93 (West 1952).
Id. art. 94 (West Supp. 1982).

1002

Loyola Law Review

[Vol. 27:999

Age As An Impediment
Age traditionally has been considered an impediment to marriage; it is within the legitimate scope of the state's regulatory
power to prevent and prohibit marriages between parties whom it
considers too young to take that momentous step. Certainly, a liberal policy on the age question could lead to unstable unions which
might ultimately end in divorce, creating social welfare problems
with regard to children of the marriage, and perhaps the spouses,
and generally undermining the value attaching to family solidarity.
Yet, the Code does not establish an unqualified age impediment to
contracting a lawful marriage.
Article 92 attempts only in appearance to establish an age limitation to marriage:
Ministers of the gospel and magistrates, entrusted with the power of
celebrating marriages, are prohibited to marry any male under the
age of eighteen years, and any female under the age of sixteen, and
if any of them are convicted of having married such persons, he shall
be removed from his office, if a magistrate, or deprived forever of
the right of celebrating marriage, if a minister of the gospel.'
The distinctive feature of this article is that the age prohibition
and corresponding sanction for breach are directed to the celebrants of the marriage and not the parties. An admittedly literal
reading of this paragraph of article 92 thus implies that parties of
any age can be married in Louisiana provided they can find a celebrant who will not question their ages. Moreover, it does not appear that such marriages can be annulled, for the sanction articulated in article 92 is directed toward the officiating minister and
not the parties. The legislative intent in this provision seems to
have been to discourage such youthful marriages by placing sanctions where they would be most effective, but to uphold such marriages once they had been contracted. The wording of the article
and its focus upon the celebrant undermines the effect of the "age
impediment" and-what is worse-makes the notion of minimum
age a seemingly perfunctory requirement which lacks any juridical
consequence for the validity of marriage.
A seventeen-year-old male, for example, who wishes to marry
his sixteen-year-old girlfriend and does so by falsifying documents
or through some other artifice (or, say, simply because of the inat9.

LA. CIv. CODE ANN.

art. 92 (West Supp. 1982).
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tention or physical disability of the celebrant) would, under article
92, not be subject to any sanction and the marriage, it seems,
would be considered valid. Only the celebrant would be subject to
a penalty. A reading of the formal language of the Code, then, simply does not support the conclusion that age is an impediment to
marriage. The first paragraph of article 92 could have read:
Males under the age of eighteen years, and females under the age of
sixteen cannot marry. Marriages which are contracted in violation of
these minimum ages will be considered unlawful. Ministers and
magistrates who are convicted of having married such persons will
be deprived of the right of celebrating marriages (in the case of ministers) and shall be removed from office (in the case of magistrates).
In its present form, article 92 implies a legislative intent to minimize, if not eliminate, any age impediment to marriage in
Louisiana.
Minority
The provisions relating to the marriage of minors indicate that
the less-than-explicit language of article 92 regarding minimum
age for marriage is not the only shadow of ambiguity cast upon the
so-called "age impediment" to marriage. Article 97 provides:
The minor of either sex, who has attained the competent age to
marry, must have received the consent of his father and mother or
of the survivor of them; and if they are both dead, the consent of his
tutor.
He must furnish proof of this consent to the officer to whom he applies for permission to marry.'"
Although this article refers to the "minor of either sex,"', reading
the provision in conjunction with article 37 makes clear that it applies to females exclusively. On the one hand, article 37 provides
that "[m]inors are those who have not attained the age of eighteen
years";1 on the other hand, article 92 provides, in relevant part,
that the competent age to marry for males is eighteen years.' 3
Therefore, males cannot be married by a minister or magistrate
until they have reached the age of majority. Females, who can be
married by a minister or magistrate at the age of sixteen, must
10.
11.
12.
13.

Id. art. 97 (West 1952).

Id.
Id. art. 37 (West Supp. 1982).
Id. art. 92.

1004

Loyola Law Review

[Vol. 27:999

receive the consent of both parents in order to marry before the
age of eighteen. There is an evident need to eliminate the discrepancy between the language of articles 37, 92, and 97, perhaps by
amending the age requirement in article 92 to reflect the contemporary standards established in article 37. This reformulation is
the only way to give the opening clause of article 97 meaning
within the pattern of regulation outlined in Book I.
Second, the language of article 97 expressly provides that consent must be had of the father and mother.1 ' What happens if the
parents disagree-if the mother agrees to the marriage, but the father withholds his consent and cannot be persuaded to approve the
marriage? Unlike the current French law, 15 the Louisiana Civil
Code does not provide that a disagreement between the parents
amounts to consent. Rather than provide an easy or a functional
remedy for these family disputes, the Louisiana Civil Code seems
to give priority to the notion of family solidarity-that a minor
within the family cannot establish her own family without the approval of both parents. Despite the equality of status that such a
provision implicitly establishes between the husband and wife in
terms of authority within the household (this contrasts markedly
with other provisions of Book I, most notably article 1201" and to a
lesser extent with article 21617), one wonders whether such a sys-

tem is not more conducive to family disharmony than to unity.
These doubts are especially strong when the legal consequences of
the failure to obtain the requisite consent are mapped out in relation to the validity of such marriages.
Third, unlike the provisions of article 92, the (minor must furnish proof to the celebrant that she has obtained the consent of
her parents to marry. In direct contrast to article 92, article 97 addresses the party to the marriage, regulates her conduct, and imposes responsibilities upon her. This provision has all the makings
of an absolute impediment, were it not for the fact that the sanction imposed for the failure to comply with the requirement has,
by explicit codal language, no bearing upon the validity of such
marriages. Article 112 reads:
The marriage of minors, contracted without the consent of the fa14.
15.

16.
17.

Id. art. 97 (West 1952).
CODE CIVIL [C. civ.] art. 148 (Fr.).
LA. CIv. CODE ANN. art. 120 (West 1952).
Id. art. 216.
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ther and mother, can not for that cause be annulled, if it is otherwise contracted with the formalities prescribed by law; but such
want of consent shall be a good cause for the father and mother to
disinherit their children thus married, if they think proper."8
In summary, the codal provisions relating to the age requirement for marriage are confusing in their substance and unclear in
their policy. The Code appears simultaneously to affirm its commitment to traditional views about the power of the state to prescribe age requirements, and to subv9rt those traditional principles
by rendering them ineffective to influence the legal validity of noncomplying marriages. The Code seems to proclaim family solidarity
as the driving force of the law of Persons and, in the same breath,
couches its proclamation in language that speaks more to the right
of adolescents to marry despite would-be impediments of the state
or the opposition of the parents. Given this oscillation, it is difficult to ascertain whether the notion of "age impediment" to marriage is still a part of Book I of the Code. One might be tempted to
conclude that age simply has no direct bearing upon the validity of
marriage; that, despite the apparent coexistence of competing policy perspectives, the Code appears to validate marriages despite
failure to respect the age requirement. This statement seems to be
the message the Code conveys to the courts and to the legal community; obviously, the message could have been drafted in more
forthright and less convoluted language. 19
Consanguinity
Nor are the consanguinity prohibitions free of difficulty. While
the language of article 94 is classic and clear-cut, article 95 contains a troublesome and perplexing paragraph. Article 94 establishes unequivocally that the scope of the consanguinity prohibition extends to "persons related to each other in the direct
ascending or descending line," adding that "[t]his prohibition is
not confined to legitimate children, it extends also to children born
out of marriage. '20 The language of article 95, which establishes
the impediment relating to collateral relationships, reads in relevant part: "Among collateral relations, marriage is prohibited be18. Id. art. 112.
19. For a discussion of this topic, see The Work of the Louisiana Legislature for the
1978 Regular Session-A Student Symposium, 39 LA. L. REV. 129 (1978) and Note, 36 LA.
L. REV. 826 (1976). See also R. PASCAL, supra note 4, at 54-56.
20.

LA. CIv. CODE ANN. art. 94 (West Supp. 1982).
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tween brother and sister, whether of the whole or of the half blood,
whether legitimate or illegitimate, between uncle and niece, between aunt and nephew, and also between first cousins."2' The se-

rious tenor of this provision and its status as a bona fide and unqualified impediment to marriage is attested to by the subsequent
language of the article, preventing the evasion of the impediment
through jurisdictional and procedural stratagems:
No marriage contracted in contravention of the above provisions in
another state by citizens of this state, without first having acquired
a domicile out of this state, shall have any legal effect in this state.
No officer whose duty it is to issue a marriage license shall do so
until he shall have received an affidavit from one of the parties to
the marriage to the effect that he or she is not related
to the other
2
party within the degree prohibited hereinbefore.

1

These two statements clearly evidence a legislative intent to have
the impediment of collateral relationships fully applied and enforced, translating a commonly-held view that such marital unions
are morally abhorrent and biologically dangerous.
The third paragraph of article 95, however, undercuts and perhaps eliminates the effect of the foregoing language. It reads that
"[a]ll such marriages heretofore made in contravention of the
above provisions shall be considered as legal. ' ' 28 In other words, all

marriages entered into before 1981, the date of the last reenactment of the third paragraph, which violated the impediment of
collateral relationships, are nonetheless lawful.24 The language of
the third paragraph raises two questions: (1) What is the status of
the legal impediment to marriage relating to collateral relationships? (2) What is the future status of the impediment for marriages that are entered into after 1981? Does the third paragraph
of article 95 in effect indicate a legislative intent to eliminate the
impediment while maintaining it formally and perfunctorily in the
Code?
By enacting this third paragraph, it appears evident that the
legislature was responding to a social problem, namely, that there
may be too many marriages of this type, especially first cousin
marriages, in Louisiana to apply a blanket prohibition and thereby
21.
22.
23.
24.

Id. art. 95.
Id.
Id.
Id.
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undermine a wide number of extant relationships. On the one
hand, the legislature achieved a rather delicate balance between
certain public policy considerations regarding marriage and the
need to respond with an intelligent sense of realism and sensitivity
to a current problem. On the other hand, in light of the difficulties
that might attend the interpretation of the other impediments to
marriage in Chapter Two of Title Four, one wonders whether the
integration of a wide-ranging exception was the most appropriate
way of responding to the problem. From the perspective of general
interpretation, paragraph three of article 95 at least places the impediment of collateral relationships in an ambiguous posture and
may even appear to gut the impediment entirely. Obviously, the
legislature wanted to maintain the statement of this classical impediment in the Code, but, in its present form with the addition of
the third paragraph, it seems-at least to some degree-that the
provision is meaningless. This interpretation is buttressed by the
fact that the whole of Chapter Two seems to adopt, albeit indirectly, a very restrictive attitude toward the notion of legal impediments to marriage-an attitude which gains some expression in the
language of article 96, which reads that "[a]ll other impediments
2' 5
on account of relationship or affinity are abolished.

Interpreted as an organic whole, Chapters One and Two of Title Four are characterized by an understated, but nonetheless distinct, policy that the power of state regulation should be minimized whenever possible and the parties given the right, despite
certain disabilities, to enter into the contractual arrangement. It
would appear, however, to be more logical and consistent to articulate these policy objectives in language that more clearly reflects
this basic legislative intent, thereby clarifying the exact status of
the would-be age and collateral relationship impediments.
THE PUTATIVE MARRIAGE RULES

Judicial Construction of Articles 117 and 118
The key provision of articles 117 and 118 is the good faith requirement-a null marriage will produce its civil effects as to the
parties and their children only if the marriage was contracted in
good faith.2 6 If only one of the parties acted in good faith, i.e., was
25.
26.

Id. art. 96 (West 1952).
Id. arts. 117 & 118.
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unaware, for example, that his or her partner was already married,
then, under article 118, "the marriage produces its civil effects only
in his or her favor, and in favor of the children born of the marriage. ''1

7

The courts, in their jurisprudence, have interpreted the

provisions of articles 117 and 118 quite liberally,28 in conformity
with what seems to be the legislative intent that underlies the
codal language.
According to the jurisprudence, the putative marriage doctrine
means that the civil effects of marriage will flow in favor of the
party who marries in good faith and the children born of that marriage.29 Conferring the status of a putative spouse upon a partner
to a void marriage is especially important for wrongful death and
workmen's compensation actions;80 the courts, for example, have
excluded concubines (defined by the courts as a bad faith spouse in
a putative marriage) from benefits under workmen's compensation
statutes."1 A good faith putative wife has the right of the surviving
wife to the marital portion. 2 Moreover, under article 160, the good
faith putative wife may be entitled to permanent alimony from a
27. Id. art. 118.
28. See, e.g., Lee v. Hunt, 483 F. Supp. 826 (W.D. La. 1979), aff'd, 631 F.2d 1171 (5th
Cir. 1980); King v. Cancienne, 316 So. 2d 366 (La. 1975); In re Koonce, 380 So. 2d 140 (La.
App. 1st Cir. 1979), writ denied, 383 So. 2d 23 (La. 1980).
29. See, e.g., Kimball v. Folsom, 150 F. Supp. 482 (W.D. La. 1957); Weaver v. Byrd,
126 So. 2d 385 (La. App. 2d Cir.), cert. denied, 126 So. 2d 385 (La. 1960); Succession of
Hopkins, 114 So. 2d 742 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1959).
30. See, e.g., King v. Cancienne, 316 So. 2d 366 (La. 1975); Succession of Fields, 222
La. 310, 62 So. 2d 495 (1952); Liberty Mut. Ins. Co. v. Caesar, 345 So. 2d 64 (La. App. 3d
Cir.), writ denied, 347 So. 2d 1118 (La. 1977).
31. See, e.g., Liberty Mut. Ins. Co. v. Caesar, 345 So. 2d 64 (La. App. 3d Cir.), cert.
denied, 347 So. 2d 1118 (La. 1977). But see Henderson v. Travelers Ins. Co., 354 So. 2d 1031
(La. 1978), in which former Justice Tate, now on the Federal Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals,
reversed the jurisprudential position established in Humphreys v. Marquette Cas. Co., 235
La. 355, 103 So. 2d 895 (La. 1958), disallowing workmen's compensation benefits to concubines. The Tate opinion in Henderson is characteristically brilliant and masterful; it is cast
in an analytic mold that usually applies in delictual liability cases. Rather than focusing
upon the family law aspect of the litigation, Justice Tate, to the vehement objections of
former Justice Summers, emphasizes exclusively the socioeconomic purpose of the workmen's compensation statute, disregarding totally the very pertinent language of article 88 of
the Code. Despite the limited character of its holding, Henderson appears to work a substantial change upon Book I without ever taking its provisions into account. While the result is far from objectionable, especially in light of the circumstances of the case, it may
herald the expansion of judicial discretion and activity in this area, leading to the application of a type of tort liability calculus in Persons litigation. In light of its implications upon
the distinctly civilian features of this litigation and upon the notion of state regulation and
public policy, the Henderson reasoning and holding may represent an interesting but untoward judicial initiative.
32. See, e.g., Succession of Fields, 222 La. 310, 62 So. 2d 495 (1952).
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bad faith husband,3 3 (presumably, uniquely without reference to
fault since no marriage existed in which fault could take place).
The children born of such a union are legitimate provided at least
one spouse contracted the marriage in good faith.3 4 The civil effects of marriage will continue for as long as the putative spouse
remains in good faith, i.e., they will terminate upon the spouse
35
gaining knowledge of the invalidity of the marriage.
The Test of Good Faith
As mentioned previously, the crucial requirement of the putative marriage doctrine is that it applies only when at least one of
the parties is in good faith. The test applied by the courts in Louisiana to determine good faith centers upon the determination of
whether the spouse claiming the effects of a putative marriage had
an honest and a reasonable belief that the marriage was valid and
that no legal impediment existed.36 Decisional law has emphasized
that the test to assess the quality of the spouse's belief does not
require an absolute belief, but rather a relative one.3 7 Moreover,
the existence of a good faith belief has been characterized as a factual question, to be determined in an ad hoc fashion according to
the specific circumstances of each case."' In addition, courts have
ruled that, when a claim of putative marriage arises, good faith is
presumed to exist in favor of the party claiming to be a putative
spouse who entered into the marriage without any impediment.3 9
Finally, in another formulation of the presumptive standard, the
courts have held that good faith on the part of the parties to a
33. See, e.g., Cortes v. Fleming, 307 So. 2d 611 (La. 1974). See also Annot., 81
A.L.R.3d 281 (1977).
34. See, e.g., Succession of Zinsel, 360 So. 2d 587 (La. App. 4th Cir.), writ denied, 363
So. 2d 72 (La. 1978); Succession of Barbier, 296 So. 2d 390 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1974); Farrell
v. Farrell, 275 So. 2d 489 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1973).
35. See, e.g., Lee v. Hunt, 483 F. Supp. 826 (W.D. La. 1979), aff'd, 631 F.2d 1171 (5th
Cir. 1980).
36. See, e.g., Gathright v. Smith, 368 So. 2d 679 (La. 1979); Succession of Pigg, 228 La.
799, 84 So. 2d 196 (1955); Succession of Fields, 222 La. 310, 62 So. 2d 495 (1952); Clark v.
Clark, 192 So. 2d 594 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1966); Succession of Primus, 131 So. 2d 319 (La.
App. 1st Cir. 1961). But see Brinson v. Brinson, 233 La. 417, 96 So. 2d 653 (1957).
37. See, e.g., Succession of Primus, 131 So. 2d 319 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1961).
38. See, e.g., Eddy v. Eddy, 271 So. 2d 333 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1972), writ refused, 272
So. 2d 695 (La. 1973); Jones v. Equitable Life Assur. Soc., 173 So. 2d 373 (La. App. 1st Cir.),
writ refused, 247 La. 1019, 175 So. 2d 302 (1965); Succession of Davis, 142 So. 2d 481 (La.
App. 2d Cir. 1962).
39. See, e.g., Succession of Fuselier, 325 So. 2d 296 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1975), writs
refused, 329 So. 2d 462 (La. 1976).
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putative marriage is presumed, and the burden of proof to establish bad faith rests with the opponent. Any doubts will be resolved
in favor of a finding of good faith. 0
The Rights of the Children
Despite the liberal judicial construction and application of articles 117 and 118 and the flexible definiton of the good faith requirement, one inequity seems to arise from the literal language of
the codal provisions. For the adults in the relationship, putative
status has an important impact upon alimony considerations,
wrongful death actions, and workmen's compensation claims as
well as upon succession rights. For example, according to the jurisprudence, a good-faith putative wife may be entitled to permanent
alimony as -a civil effect of a putative marriage from a bad-faith
husband.41 Moreover, if a man marries a second wife who is in
good faith, but the man does not have his first marriage dissolved,
both his spouses are allowed to share in his succession, each spouse
being entitled to one-half of the community
property acquired dur42
marriages.
two
the
of
coexistence
ing the
Upon initial analysis, the legal rights of the children born of a
would-be putative marriage appear to be as strongly protected as
those of a good-faith putative spouse. For example, in circumstances in which a putative marriage ends soon after the birth of a
child, that child is entitled, according to the decisional law, to a
forced portion amounting to one-third of his father's estate, or he
can share equally with his half-brother in his father's succession
(in addition to having a claim to child support).4" Moreover, the
courts also have held that a child born of a putative marriage-one
contracted in good faith by at least one of the parties-is considered a legitimate child as to both contracting parties." This apparently liberal jurisprudential position, inspired in all likelihood by
the express language of article 118, contains the seeds of a flagrant
40. See, e.g., Succession of Zinsel, 360 So. 2d 587 (La. App. 4th Cir.), writ denied, 363
So. 2d 72 (La. 1978); Succession of Barbier, 296 So. 2d 390 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1974).
41. See note 33 supra and accompanying text.
42. See, e.g., Prince v. Hopson, 230 La. 575, 89 So. 2d 128 (1956); Succession of
Choyce, 183 So. 2d 457 (La. App. 2d Cir.), writ refused, 249 La. 64, 184 So. 2d 735 (1966).
43. See, e.g., Succession of Zinsel, 360 So. 2d 587 (La. App. 4th Cir.), writ denied, 363
So. 2d 72 (La. 1978); Succession of Barbier, 296 So. 2d 390 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1974).
44. See, e.g., Cortes v. Fleming, 267 So. 2d 236 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1972), rev'd on other
grounds, 307 So. 2d 611 (La. 1974); Melancon v. Sonnier, 157 So. 2d 577 (La. App. 3d Cir.
1963).
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inequity which stands in complete contradistinction to the pre1976 decisional law regarding the legitimacy of children and the
presumption of paternity contained in article 184. The codal provisions and the decisional law that accompanies them and illustrates
their meaning make the status of children totally dependent upon
whether at least one of the parties contracted the marriage in good
faith. According to the jurisprudence, in circumstances in which
both parties contracted the marriage with knowledge, for example,
of an undissolved prior union, i.e., neither party was in good faith,
the marriage is void ab initio and does not produce any legal effect
as to the issue."'
The express language of article 118 leaves the courts with little
recourse but to apply the good faith requirement as it is stated.
The explicit language and unmistakable intent of a codal provision, however, do not always act as a sufficient obstacle to judicial
creativity, preventing the courts from finding ambiguity even in
the most clear-cut provisions and reaching holdings which, despite
their evident departure from the result mandated by the legislative
will, foster a judicially-favored policy objective. An evident case in
point of this type of judicial legislation concerns the pre-1976 jurisprudence 'relating to the article 184 presumption of paternity.
There, the courts sometimes attributed paternity to a husband despite uncontestable biological facts to the contrary."' The policy
objective here was to confer the status of legitimacy upon all children (who, in this equation, were innocent victims) at any price
and in complete disregard of the rights and interests of blameless
husbands of wives who engaged in provable extra-marital episodes.
Reasoning by analogy from the article 184 jurisprudence, the
courts, when confronted with a policy dilemma under article 118,
had a choice between two alternatives: either subvert the semantic
content of article 118 or engage-by a relaxation of evidentiary
standards-in a process of finding good faith on the part of at least
one spouse in every putative marriage case. The Louisiana courts,
however, appeared to have found each alternative unsatisfactory,
perhaps in light of the implications of such a position for alimony,
wrongful death, and workmen's compensation actions. In a word,
the courts seem to have applied the language of article 118 without
any overriding policy objective in mind which would contradict the
45. See, e.g., Burrell v. Burrell, 154 So. 2d 103 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1963).
46. See Spaht & Shaw, The Strongest Presumption Challenged: Speculations on
Warren v. Richard and Succession of Mitchell, 37 LA. L. REv. 59 (1976).
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express language of the codal provision.
This judicial construction, however, is inconsonant with the
policy imperatives that underpin the legitimacy rulings, creating a
tension between the manner in which the courts interpret two different but closely related sections of Book I. In marked contrast to
the paternity holdings, under article 118 the children born of a
nonputative void marriage are helpless innocent victims who pay
the price for the conduct of two adults: their status as legitimate or
illegitimate children is determined completely by the acts and intentions of their biological parents (at least one of whom must
have contracted the marriage in good faith if the children are to
gain the status of legitimate children).
Recommendations: The French Example
It could and probably will be argued that this type of inequity,
given the liberal judicial definition of good faith in this context and
the remote possibility that a suitable case would arise, is of no
practical moment. Such cases, however, are far from inconceivable;
they have actually arisen.' 7 More importantly, in systemic terms, a
codal provision bearing the seeds of an injustice should be reconsidered and modified. Moreover, if the Code is to be seen as an
organic text which provides unambiguous and principled juridical
guidance for the regulation of social relationships, it appears incongruous to allow related sections of the same book of the Code to be
construed with a different policy calculus in mind. Little seems to
be at stake regarding the concept of family solidarity-the often
cited ideological value promoted by the Code. The rights and interests of children whose parents married without conforming to
legal prescriptions appear to be the paramount consideration in
this framework.
Engaging in judicial distortion or disregard of the unmistakable language of article 118 is inapposite in a civilian jurisdiction.
Reformulation of the codal language is a more appropriate solution
and could be achieved by comparing the Louisiana provisions to
their analogues in the French Code civil. Articles 201 and 202 of
the French Code establish two distinct sets of rules relating to the
legal consequences of a would-be putative union. One regime pertains to the spouses and the other concerns the children born of
47.

See note 45 supra and accompanying text.
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such a marriage. Much like its counterpart in the Louisiana Code,
article 201 of the French Code civil" provides that a "null marriage produces its effects in regard to the spouses if the marriage
was contracted in good faith."' 9 The language of article 201 further
states that "if there is good faith only on the part of one spouse,
the marriage will produce its effects only as to that spouse. ' Unlike its analogue in the Louisiana Code, article 202 of the French
Code civil" states that the civil effects of a null marriage will take
place in relation to the children of the marriage "even if both
spouses are in bad faith. 6' 2 In these cases, the questions relating to
the children will be handled as in a divorce case; 3 their status as
legitimate children is never brought into question.
The comparison to French law is instructive and provides a
clear example of how to eliminate the inequity that might attend
the literal application of the good faith requirement in articles 117
and 118 of the Louisiana Civil Code. The integration of a provision
similar to article 202 of the French Code civil would eliminate any
possibility that children of a void marriage could be victimized by
the actions of their biological parents. This type of outcome not
only corresponds with a basic common-sense understanding of
what result should be achieved in such situations, but also it is in
keeping with the liberal thrust of the judicial construction of articles 117 and 118 and the jurisprudence and recent legislation concerning the legitimacy question. Finally, such a modification of the
codal text would not compromise the commitment of the Civil
Code to the concept of family solidarity (if that value remains a
part of the ideological foundation of the Code).
EQUALITY OF RIGHTS AND DUTIES BETWEEN SPOUSES
Articles 119 and 120 of the Louisiana Civil Code articulate the
respective rights and duties of married persons." The substance of
these provisions, in some respects, is inconsistent with the recent
reform of Book 3 of the Code" and raises issues regarding the sta48.
49.
50.
51.
52.
53.
54.
55.

C. civ. art. 201.
Id.
Id.
Id. art 202.
Id.
Id.
LA. CIV. CODE ANN. arts. 119 & 120 (West 1952).
See Riley, Analysis of The 1980 Revision of The Matrimonial Regimes Law of
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tus of women under Louisiana's Law of Persons. Article 119 clearly
establishes that a principle of equality (in the sense of mutuality
and reciprocity) governs the duties of husbands and wives. The
parties to the marriage "owe to each other mutually, fidelity, support and assistance."5 6 The specific content of these duties has
57
been defined by the courts in the context of particular cases;
since they have a public policy character, these duties cannot be
58
modified by the agreement of the parties.
The substance of article 120 contains the statement of a more
traditional, if not outmoded, view of the respective position of the
husband and wife in the marriage relationship. According to the
language of article 120, "[t]he wife is bound to live with her husband and to follow him wherever he chooses to reside; the husband
is obliged to receive her and to furnish her with whatever is required for the convenience of life, in proportion to his means and
condition."5 9 Although the husband and wife both have obligations
under this provision, the notion of mutuality is only dimly apparent and certainly does not imply equal duties between the spouses.
Rather, article 120 emphasizes consecrated social and economic
differences between the spouses. The Louisiana Code here is faithful to a long-standing civilian tradition of the bonus paterfamilias
which views the husband as the head of the household and the
primary authority figure in the family. Obviously, this tradition
upholds the notion of family solidarity in its classical sense; establishing one spouse as the principal authority in the family minimizes the disunity that can emerge from uncontrollable dissent between the spouses. Moreover, it appears that the language of
article 120 reflects an economic reality that may still characterize
most Louisiana households: the husband is the principal source of
income for the family, and his occupation may require him to move
to another location. In order to keep the family together during
what may be a difficult transition, the Code obliges the wife and
children to accompany the husband and father to the new location,
provided the husband welcomes the wife to the new domicile and
Louisiana, 26 Loy. L. REV. 453 (1980).
56. LA. CIv. CODE ANN. art. 119 (West 1952) (emphasis added).
57. See, e.g., Smith v. Smith, 382 So. 2d 972 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1980); Hingle v. Hingle,
369 So. 2d 271 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1979); Favrot v. Barnes, 332 So. 2d 873 (La. App. 4th Cir.),
rev'd on other grounds, 339 So. 2d 843 (La.), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 961 (1976), cert. denied,
431 U.S. 966 (1977).
58. See, e.g., Holliday v. Holliday, 358 So. 2d 618 (La. 1978).
59. LA. CIV. CODE ANN. art. 120 (West 1952).
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furnishes her with the "convenience of life, in proportion to his
means and condition.' ' 60
The decisional law, of course, has addressed the evident
problems of defining the circumstances in which a refusal to follow
the husband constitutes abandonment, 6' when his choice of a conjugal domicile is unreasonable," and what is meant by the term

"convenience of life."6 " The language and substance of article 120,
however, raise preliminary issues of more fundamental importance.

First, there is. the question of the consistency between the substance of article 120 on the one hand and, on the other hand, the
language of article 119 and the recent reform of Book 3 which now

provides for the equal management of the community property regime by the spouses. 6 4 Moreover, the maternal preference rule in

child custody cases has been challenged by the best-interest-ofthe-child formula in article 14611 and the former gender-based discrimination for alimony purposes has been abolished under the re-

formulation of article 160.6 In light of these developments, which
neutralized in terms of gender-based distinctions the codal texts,
why does article 120 continue to express the duty of married
couples to cohabit in terms of sexual differences? This unjustified

inconsistency has dire implications for the legal status of women in
marriage. Are they to have an inferior status to men in terms of
conjugal authority? Other civilian jurisdictions, like France, have
eliminated any formal legal disparity between men and women in
the marital relationship. According to article 215 of the French
60.

Id.

61. See, e.g., Stelly v. Montgomery, 347 So. 2d 1145 (La. 1977); Bush v. Bush, 232 La.
747, 95 So. 2d 298 (1957).
62. See, e.g., Bush v. Bush, 232 La. 747, 95 So. 2d 298 (1957); Welsh v. Welsh, 322 So.
2d 352 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1975), aff'd, 334 So. 2d 395 (La. 1976); Berry v. Berry, 300 So. 2d
246 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1974), rev'd on other grounds, 310 So. 2d 626 (La. 1975); Authement v.
Authement, 254 So. 2d 630 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1971); Powell v. Powell, 152 So. 2d 609 (La.
App. 2d Cir. 1963).
63. See, e.g., Failla v. Grandeury, 295 So. 2d 24 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1974); General Tire
Serv. v. Nash, 273 So. 2d 539 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1973); Leon Godchaux Clothing Co. v. Ruiz,
179 So. 2d 661 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1965); Hagedorn Motors, Inc. v. Godwin, 170 So. 2d 779
(La. App. 1st Cir. 1964).
64. For a discussion of the latter topic, see, e.g., Tete, A Critique of the Equal Management Act of 1978, 39 LA. L. REV. 491 (1979).
65. Compare Thornton v. Thornton, 377 So. 2d 417 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1979), with
Nolte v. Nolte, 258 So. 2d 118 (La. App. 2d Cir.), writ refused, 261 La. 538, 260 So. 2d 321
(1972). See also Note, 34 LA. L. REV. 881 (1974); Note, 38 LA. L. REV. 1096 (1978).
66. See, e.g., Lovell v. Lovell, 378 So. 2d 418 (La. 1979); Bruner v. Bruner, 373 So. 2d
971 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1979).
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the husband and wife are to choose the conjugal domi-

cile by common agreement. Moreover, the French Code refers expressly to the concept of parental authority, 68 while the Louisiana
Civil Code, at least in its major headings, still speaks in terms of
paternal authority. 9
Second, does the subordination of the wife to the husband's
authority under article 120 as long as he provides material comfort
reflect the contemporary view of the marital relationship? Within a
perhaps elite and privileged class in society, it is not uncommon to
find that both partners to the marriage have professional training
and both may be pursuing separate and equally prestigious and
satisfying careers. In such circumstances, if the economic rationale
for article 120 is recognized, the choice of a conjugal abode should
be left to the mutual decision of both partners; the law should not
give the husband the privilege of suing his wife for separation on
the ground of abandonment simply because she does not wish to
adhere to his choice of a conjugal domicile which answers exclusively his professional needs. The express language of article 120
simply does not take this contingency into account, giving some, if
not all, husbands an unwarranted legal advantage.
More importantly, however, the reevaluation of the role of women in society goes beyond the ideology of a particular socioeconomic stratum and has become a fairly pervasive value within society as a whole. The incorporation of the equal management
principle into the community property regime is testimony to the.
wider social currency of the principle of equality among
spouses-that one spouse is not, simply because of sex, less capable of making decisions affecting the position of the family in society. The language of article 120 is a discordant echo from the past.
Indeed, there is a misanthropic tenor to the language which depreciates and demeans the conjugal union-wives should render servile obedience to husbands as long as they are paid for their willingness to cohabit with them. This is an outmoded and offensive
conception of what it means to have married persons live together
as part of their legal and public policy obligations toward one another. The substance of article 120 should be aligned with the mutuality principle that governs article 119, borrowing to some extent
from the example of its counterpart in the French Code civil.
67.
68.

C. civ. art. 215.
Id. arts. 371-387.

69.

See Title VII, ch. 5 of Book I of the Louisiana Civil Code.
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THE ROLE OF FAULT
The Predominance of Fault
The role of fault in the imposition of legal liability is one of
the most controversial questions in all of legal literature; it surfaces not only in divorce and alimony determinations, but also in
other critical areas of the law-the law of torts and the debate surrounding the concept of strict liability being a prime example.
Book I of the Louisiana Civil Code makes the concept of fault7 0 a
central factor in the determination of whether a marriage will be
legally dissolved and also in assessing the financial consequences of
such a dissolution. The grounds for separation in the Louisiana
Civil Code can be characterized as hybrid and somewhat imbalanced, since they include both a fault and a nonfault
component.
Article 138,1 which enumerates ten causes for separation from
bed and board, does not adhere exclusively to a fault-based notion
of separation, but it nonetheless lends primacy to the concept of
fault. The first eight causes represent the traditional fault grounds
for separation contained in most civil codes, including adultery,
conviction of a serious criminal offense, habitual intemperance or
cruel treatment, abandonment, and the like.7 2 Article 138 then lists
two nonfault or mutual consent grounds which are based upon voluntary de facto separation of the spouses for a given period of
time. The fault grounds, however, are enumerated first and in
some detail, while the nonfault grounds are given less prominence
in the body of article 138, being listed last.7
The hybrid character of the grounds for separation and ultimately for divorce in the Louisiana Civil Code points to a tension
between the express and implied definition of marriage. Attributing such evident primacy to the fault concept of divorce (divorce as
70. The concept of fault in the area of Persons has given rise to numerous commentaries; a representative sample of the leading recent studies includes: Couch, Toward a More
Realistic Divorce Law, 43 TUL. L. REV. 243 (1969); Spaht, Persons, The Work of the Louisiana Appellate Courts for the 1979-1980 Term-A Faculty Symposium, 41 LA. L. REv. 372
(1981); Spaht, Persons, The Work of the Louisiana Appellate Courts for the 1978-1979
Term-A Faculty Symposium, 40 LA. L. REV. 543 (1980); Spaht, Persons, The Work of the
Louisiana Appellate Courts for the 1977-1978 Term-A Faculty Symposium, 39 LA. L.
REV. 659 (1979).
71. LA. CIV. CODE ANN. art. 138 (West Supp. 1982).
72. Id.
73. Id.
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a sanction) and maintaining a rigid distinction between separation
from bed and board and immediate divorce (allowing the latter
only for egregious fault, thereby mandating recourse to the former)
per force make the dissolution of marriage difficult and painstaking. The Louisiana codal provision, therefore, voices at least implicitly an ecclesiastic view of marriage-marriage as an indissoluble sacramental bond. At the same time, the Code contains an
expressly secular definition of marriage; according to the language
of article 86, marriage is considered "in no other view than as a
civil contract. '74 If marriage is in fact understood as a civil contract-devoid of religious overtones, not only should the dissolution of marriage be allowed, but also the means of dissolving marriage should be seen as an officiaf way of stating that the marital
union has become intolerable for at least one spouse. The substance of article 138 allows the notion of the state regulation of
marriage and the family for the well-being of the community to
overshadow the concept of marriage as a civil contract which can
be rescinded by the parties for "defective" performance. As such,
the predominance of fault gives the value of family solidarity its
strongest expression: marriages, as a general rule, will not be dissolved unless there has been a grave violation of marital duties
and, once such a violation has been established, the culprit must
be made to pay for his wrongful conduct. One wonders, however,
whether making separation and divorce difficult by incorporating
an unbending concept of fault into the separation and divorce
grounds is indeed supportive of the value of family solidarity.
Is a nineteenth century quasi-ecclesiastic view of marriage relevant in the late twentieth century? Do marriages fail because one
spouse bears the burden of fault exclusively? Is the notion of culpability workable in this traumatic and highly personal context?
Although fault-based determinations may be appropriate in some
(perhaps exceptional) cases, divorce should be seen as a solution to
a difficult problem which minimizes personal antagonisms rather
than as a form of punishment. Relegating the traditional fault
grounds to a limited role in the termination of marriage would lend
support to the view that the parties to the marital contract can
decide when their agreement is no longer viable, that they need
not go through the agonizing process of arguing culpability back
and forth, and that the psychological reality of bankrupt marriages
74.

Id. art. 86.
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precludes any reference to legal fault in most cases. The legislative
"preoccupation with fault"7' can be seen as an unwarranted infringement upon the freedom of individuals to make choices that
seriously affect the course of their lives.
The realities of life and personal relationships make little
room for an unbending and absolute view of marriage; a humanly
intolerable situation needs a workable remedy, not an antiquated
ideological gloss. Objections to religious underpinnings aside, a
more neutral and pragmatic sociological view of marriage also
might argue for the supremacy of fault. A disincentive to divorce
might maintain the solidarity of the family in a rapidly evolving
society. Encouraging, if not mandating, the continuation of unstable and unhappy unions, however, may not provide the proper environment in which to raise children or have people spend their
adult lives. Making the remedy of separation and divorce more accessible to spouses who deem that their marriage no longer is a
viable personal enterprise would not undermine family solidarity,
but, in fact, might strengthen it. The law has a two-fold mission in
this area. It must achieve a viable equilibrium between individual
and societal interests by inculcating, on the one hand, a sense of
the importance of marriage and the family in the community and,
on the other hand, by providing individuals with a relatively easy
means to disengage themselves from a tormenting bond.
Recommendations
Rather than enumerating the worst possible conduct that
spouses can inflict upon one another, article 138, in an effort to
align itself with the substance of article 86, could outline morally
neutral grounds upon which a separation and ultimately a divorce
can be granted. For example, article 138 could list (1) medical reasons for granting a separation, e.g., incurable mental disease, venereal disease, an incurable and repugnant disease, or a contagious
illness; (2) basic incompatibility of temperament, when at least one
of the spouses is convinced that they simply do not get along; and
(3) de facto separation of the spouses for a required period of time,
reflecting an irremediable breakdown of relations between the
spouses. Under this framework, separation and divorce would cease
to carry much of its social stigma; it no longer would connote per75. See Hingle v. Hingle, 369 So. 2d 271 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1979) (Beer, J., concurring); Dixon v. Dixon, 357 So. 2d 856 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1978) (Beer, J., concurring).
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sonal culpability and failure, but would stand for the view that the
marriage no longer is a viable union for the spouses; that the failure of communication has been such that it has engendered a
bankruptcy of the joint venture. Much like the grounds under article 138(9) and (10), the notion of incompatibility of temperament
and de facto separation imply mutual consent grounds, the law
recognizing that the spouses are responsible and in the best position to assess the quality of their relationship. A separation and
divorce upon the basis of fault should be an exceptional proceeding, the culpability factor being relegated to a deserved secondary,
if not tertiary, status in the breakdown of marriage.
A Comparative Reference
When contrasted with its French counterpart," article 138
manifests a definite preference for fault-based separation. The recently revised French codal provision lists three grounds for separation and divorce in the following order: (1) mutual consent; (2)
break up of the common life; and (3) the traditional grounds for
divorce." The French Code civil establishes mutual consent as the
preferred ground in separation and divorce cases; the reference to
the traditional fault grounds appears last and does not involve any
extensive enumeration. 78 The ostensible purpose of the French leg-

islation is to attenuate, if not eliminate, the unpleasant and contentious character of separation and divorce proceedings by minimizing the role of fault in such litigation.
Despite the historical affinity between the two civilian jurisdictions, the French solution may not be entirely appropriate in
Louisiana. The aim of the comparison is not to make the Louisiana
Civil Code a carbon copy of the French Code civil, but rather to
determine whether the concept of fault as it is incorporated in the
Louisiana codal provisions remains viable in light of the experimentation and reform in other civilian jurisdictions. Although the
76.
77.
78.
79.
studies.

C. civ. art. 229.
Id.
Id.
The new French divorce legislation has given rise to numerous commentaries and
See, e.g., CENTRE NATIONAL RECHERCHE SCIENTIFIQUE, REFORMES DU DROIT DE LA
FAMILLE, in 20 ARCHIVES DE PHILOSOPHIE DU DROIT (1975); R. LINDON & P. BERTIN, DIVORCE
76 (1976); J. MASsW, LA REFORME DU DIVORCE (1976); J. MASSIP & G. MORTIN, LA REFORME
DU DIVORCE (1976); Audit, Recent Revisions of the French Civil Code, the French Divorce
Reform Law of 1976, 38 LA. L. REV. 747 (1978); Glendon, The French Divorce Reform Law
of 1976, 24 AM. J. CoMP. L. 166 (1976).
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hybrid character of article 138 shows a tendency toward liberalization, the prominence of the fault grounds in the body of the provision reflects a retributive rather than remedial concept of separation and divorce. The Code holds steadfastly to a conservative,
traditional view, perhaps in the name of upholding the value of
family solidarity. Within the framework of article 138, the mutual
consent grounds appear to be a hesitant afterthought, a begrudging
and partial willingness to admit that some social evolution has
taken place since article 138 was originally enacted.
An Organic Interpretation of Fault
The cardinal importance attributed to the fault rationale by
the Louisiana Civil Code in the breakdown of marriage raises analytic problems not only with the substance of article 138, but also
with other provisions of Book I. When article 138 is viewed in relation to articles 141 and 160,80 the status of the fault rationale
comes into question. Does one definition of fault apply to separation questions and yet another apply to alimony determinations?
What is the impact of the new language of article 141 upon separation and alimony issues? Does it have a separate impact upon each
of these considerations? The following analysis addresses these and
other salient problems which arise in Book I as a result of the primacy of fault in separation, divorce, and alimony determinations.
THE IMPLICATIONS OF THE REFORMULATION OF ARTICLE 141

Before the enactment of article 141 in its present form,"'
under the theory of recrimination and its equitable rationale of
"unclean hands," if each spouse could establish fault on the part of
the other, both were prevented from obtaining a separation or divorce.8 2 The courts applied the principle of recrimination in cases
in which the spouses were deemed to be equally at fault, reasoning
that remedies were reserved to an offended and nonculpable
LA. CIV. CODE ANN. arts. 141 & 160 (West Supp. 1982).
81. Id. art. 141.
82. See, e.g., Brocato v. Brocato, 369 So. 2d 1083 (La. App. 1st Cir.), writ refused, 371
So. 2d 1341 (La. 1979); Dixon v. Dixon, 357 So. 2d 856 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1978); Couvillion
v. Couvillion, 346 So. 2d 310 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1977); Lawrence v. Lawrence, 352 So. 2d 378
(La. App. 4th Cir. 1977); Denbo v. Denbo, 345 So.. 2d 1257 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1977); Richard
v. Richard, 340 So. 2d 1104 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1976). See also Note, 24 Loy. L. REv. 776
(1978).

80.
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spouse. 83 In order to deal with cases in which there was a disproportion between the fault of the parties, the courts invoked the
doctrine of comparative rectitude under which the spouse who was
guilty of a lesser fault became entitled to relief. 84 Comparative rectitude, then, eliminated the inequity that could result from a rigid
judicial application of the recrimination principle by allowing the
courts to find a sufficient disparity between the respective fault of
the parties to provide one of them with a remedy. Presumably,
although entitled to a separation, the spouse who had a lesser fault
could not seek permanent alimony upon the granting of a divorce.
The new language of article 141 eliminates the blatant inequity that flowed from an application of the theory of recrimination
by providing that "separation from bed and board shall be granted
although both spouses are mutually at fault in causing the separation."88 While mutual fault now does not prevent the spouses from
obtaining a separation and (presumably) ultimately a divorce, fault
remains a determinative factor in assessing the financial consequences of the dissolution. The language of article 141 further provides that "[i]n such instances, alimony pendente lite may be allowed but permanent alimony shall not be allowed thereafter
following divorce." 8 This language accords with the substance of
article 160 which requires
that a spouse seeking permanent ali87
mony be free of fault.

The 1976 enactment of article 141 was the product of a liberalizing trend aimed at eliminating the theory of recrimination: when
two persons are seeking to dissolve their marriage and each has
established the fault of the other under article 138 (1) to (8), they
should not be denied a remedy simply because both were at fault.88
Under contemporary thinking, a contrary result is too egregious to
justify in the name of any policy, no matter what its ideological or
doctrinal underpinnings. While it is clear that the new language of
article 141 eliminates the doctrine of recrimination, there remains
some question as to whether it actually has or should have the
same effect upon the doctrine of comparative rectitude-if not for
purposes of separation under article 138, at least for purposes of
83.

See R. PASCAL, supra note 4, at 139.43.

84.

Id.

85.
86.
87.
88.

LA. CIv. CODE ANN. art. 141 (West Supp. 1982).
Id.
Id. art. 160.
See note 82 supra and accompanying text.

19811

Role of Fault in Marital Disputes

1023

the permanent alimony determination under article 160. It could
be argued that recrimination and comparative rectitude were so inextricably intertwined in a functional sense that once the former
was eliminated the utility of the latter ceased altogether. Despite
such arguments, the role of comparative rectitude, reinterpreted to
function as does the doctrine of comparative negligence in tort liability cases, may not have been completely extinguished, especially
in light of the fact that article 141, once it applies, precludes permanent alimony for either spouse. A weighing of the respective
fault of the parties for the alimony determination could have significant practical and doctrinal import.
COMPARATIVE RECTITUDE IN THE CONTEXT OF PERMANENT ALIMONY DETERMINATIONS
It is evident that, under the current language of article 141,
the doctrine of comparative rectitude no longer can serve its previous equitable function. Now, regardless of mutual fault, spouses
can obtain a legal remedy. Article 141 speaks expressly in terms of
the mutual and not the equal fault of the spouses. Viewing article
141 as a type of bridge between articles 138 and 160, one might
interpret the separation and alimony provisions of article 141 to
mean that, once either party establishes that the other spouse has
engaged in conduct covered by article 138 (1) to (8), he or she may
obtain a separation and ultimately a divorce, but that neither is
entitled to permanent alimony. This interpretation of the implications of article 141 leaves a number of critical questions unanswered: Does the failure to refer explicitly to equal fault mean that
the relative weighing of the respective fault no longer can take
place in any context for any purpose? In light of its alimony provision, is the reference to fault in article 141 synonymous with fault
under article 138? Can a distinction be made between fault for
separation purposes and fault for permanent alimony considerations, between legal fault and a factually-established but legally
nonactionable fault under article 160? Using a reasoning reminiscent of the doctrine of comparative rectitude, could article 141 be
interpreted to mean that the spouse who is guilty of a much lesser
fault than the other is still entitled to some form of permanent
alimony under article 160?
In a recent opinion, 89 Judge Beer expressed the problem elo89.

Hingle v. Hingle, 369 So. 2d 271 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1979).
0
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quently and cogently:
We continue to be preoccupied with "fault" (which Webster defines
as a moral weakness less serious than a vice), and that preoccupation continues-more often than not-to result in knee jerk determinations of "mutual fault."
It is an oversimplification to say that a marriage of 25 or 30
years which has gone stale, with resulting degrees of disappointment, contempt, disgust, and, finally, abhorrence on the part of the
parties, is the result of "mutual fault" to the extent that such determination absolutely preempts any consideration of alimony. Unless
one or the other of the parties has conducted himself or herself in a
totally abhorrent and classically unacceptable way, the determination of an award of permanent alimony should not be irrebuttably
preempted on a premise of such a disjointed, nebulous concept as
"mutual fault." What is, in most cases, nothing more or less than
mutual disillusionment should not summarily deprive either party
of their justiciable right to seek alimony.90
In his evaluation of the "jurisprudential treatment of the alimony
issue" 9 1 in Louisiana, Judge Beer further states that, "from the
standpoint of realism and common sense. . . the central guideline
should be need-instead of fault (or gender)." 9" Article 141 does
not explicitly abolish comparative rectitude and, as a consequence,
the doctrine could be retained in some form as an instrument of
judicial construction applying to permanent alimony determinations. Indeed, if the Louisiana Code is to maintain some commitment to the fault rationale while pursuing a liberalization of the
law in this area, the doctrine of comparative rectitude might constitute a useful first step in attenuating the doctrinal impact of the
fault concept.
THE FLOATING FAULT CALCULUS
Article 138 (1) to (8) defines the notion of fault by enumerating a presumably exhaustive list of marital fault categories. Some
of the fault grounds are less rigorous than others. For example, the
abuse of alcohol is a less comprehensive and less open-ended
ground than cruel treatment, which the decisional law has interpreted to include mental cruelty." Moreover, some of the provi90.
91.
92.
93.

Id. at 272-73 (Beer, J., concurring) (emphasis in original).
Id. at 273.
Id.
See, e.g., Adams v. Adams, 380 So. 2d 737 (La. App. 4th Cir.), writ granted, 383
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sions appear to be inconsistent on their face;' 4 others seem to pose
considerable problems of interpretation in relation to other provisions in the Code. 9 5 Be that as it may, article 138 establishes no
grading or ordering of the grounds in terms of a substantive hierarchy; it seems that some grounds are easier to establish than others
or they at least reflect less blameworthy conduct (mental cruelty
being assessed by a subjective standard is a case in point)." Depending upon how a particular court reads the specific circumstances of individual cases, it is possible to have a widely varying
scale of conduct amounting to legal fault in the marriage context:
from quotidian friction and constant nagging to abuse of stimulants and intentional nonsupport to outright physical brutality.
A priori, there is nothing wrong with having fault grounds
which cover a vast spectrum of conduct; in fact, it may be a way of
liberalizing the fault concept for separation purposes without eradicating it or unduly minimizing it. If the spouses want to state officially why their marriage broke down in terms of the causative categories provided by law, they can do so and gain whatever
satisfaction is offered by such a procedure. They may want the disparity and disproportion between their conduct to be recognized:
the wife may be a habitual nagger while the husband is addicted to
alcohol; the wife may have committed adultery while the husband
was standing trial for a felony; the husband may have publicly defamed his wife after she attempted to take his life. Whether the
spouses want to terminate their joint venture on the basis of mutual consent or as a result of what each of them conceives to be the
fault of the other, they should be afforded an appropriate legal
remedy. The disproportion between the respective wrongful conduct is of no significance provided the effect of fault, determined
So. 2d 1263 (La. 1980); Gibbon v. Gibbon, 337 So. 2d 298 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1976); Loyd v.
Loyd, 336 So. 2d 912 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1976); McVay v. McVay, 276 So. 2d 926 (La. App. 3d
Cir. 1973); Manley v. Manley, 188 So. 2d 194 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1966).
94. See LA. CIv. CODE ANN. art. 138(7) (West Supp. 1982), which speaks of a spouse

being charged with a felony, then refers to evidence indicating that the spouse has actually
been guilty of such a felony. Also, one wonders why article 138(6) is not included in the
article 139 enumeration along with adultery and conviction of felony. It seems that the attempt on the life of one spouse by the other would be as serious as the other two grounds.
For this latter point, I am indebted to Mr. David Amoni, a third-year law student at Tulane
University School of Law. Finally, it seems inconsistent to have the paragraphs, article
138(9) & (10) essentially performing the same function on the basis of different statutory
periods of voluntary separation.
95. Most notably, the problem of the interrelation between id. arts. 138, 141 & 160.
96. See R. PASCAL, supra note 4, at 116.
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under article 138, is limited to the granting of a separation and
divorce.
Once fault is established, however, it does technically, as
Judge Beer pointed out,9 have a dispositive effect upon whether a
spouse is entitled to alimony (and it may also have an indirect impact upon the child custody question). Here, both articles 141 and
160 appear to provide that, once a spouse is held to be at fault
under article 138, he or she is barred from receiving permanent
alimony (regardless of need).98 The disproportion between the
wrongful acts for purposes of this determination should be relevant, especially if the need on the part of the spouse who is less at
fault is substantial. The utility of maintaining the doctrine of comparative rectitude for alimony purposes," then, is evident; it constitutes a means by which to introduce different definitions of the
concept of marital fault in the several articles and to establish
that, although a given conduct may be actionable as fault for article 138 separation purposes, it does not constitute a legal or proximate cause or fault for purposes of permanent alimony determinations under article 160. This floating fault calculus, while it would
increase their discretion in these matters, would allow the courts to
minimize the impact of fault upon the financial consequences of a
dissolution of marriage and emphasize the consideration of need at
least in circumstances in which a spouse has done relatively little
to make the marriage fail according to technical legal conceptions.
To some extent the courts already have laid the groundwork
for these separate definitions of marital fault. In interpreting and
applying article 160, for example, the courts have referred to fault
in a two-fold manner. On the one hand, they have considered article 160 fault (which is dispositive of the alimony question) as the
equivalent of a finding of fault under article 138(1) to (8):10o if a
spouse is adjudged to have been mentally cruel, then that spouse
97. See note 89 supra and accompanying text.
98. LA. CIv. CODE ANN. arts. 140 & 160 (West Supp. 1982).
99. For an application of the doctrine, see, e.g., Douglas v. Douglas, 342 So. 2d 1124
(La. App. 4th Cir. 1976); Rayborn v. Rayborn, 246 So. 2d 400 (La. App. 1st Cir.), writ refused, 258 La. 775, 247 So. 2d 868 (1971); O'Neill v. O'Neill, 196 So. 2d 669 (La. App. 1st
Cir. 1967).
100. See, e.g., Smith v. Smith, 216 So. 2d 391 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1968). See also Douglas v. Douglas, 385 So. 2d 402 (La. App. 1st Cir.), writ refused, 386 So. 2d 358 (La. 1980);
Brocato v. Brocato, 369 So. 2d 1083 (La. App. 1st Cir.), writ refused, 371 So. 2d 1341 (La.
1979); Saucier v. Saucier, 357 So. 2d 1378 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1978); R. PASCAL, supra note 4,
at 235-39.
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has been at fault and is not entitled to permanent alimony,
whatever his or her need may be. On the other hand, and in almost
the same breath, the courts have spoken of actionable fault under
article 160 as conduct of a serious nature which amounts to an independent contributing factor or a proximate cause of the separation. 101 This double characterization is not without its doctrinal
implications, especially in a civilian jurisdiction in which the Code
outlines expressly the instances of marital fault for separation purposes. By adopting this proximate cause formulation to refer to
fault, the courts appear to be asking for a certain latitude in interpreting and a certain discretion in applying the fault concept
under article 160. To avoid gross inequity and patent injustice,
there is a need, felt by the jurisprudence, to incorporate some
equivalent of the doctrine of comparative rectitude into the alimony area, to devise, in effect, separate definitions of fault for different legal questions relating to the breakdown of a marriage.
The argument for construing the Louisiana Civil Code to provide for a floating fault calculus between articles 138, 141 and 160
(which admittedly has been motivated by the conviction that the
concept of fault occupies an altogether unwarranted place of primacy in this area) loses some of its thrust in the face of the jurisprudential rule that, once the fault question has been litigated in a
separation proceeding, it cannot be relitigated in the divorce proceeding unless there has been post-separation fault.10 2 It seems,
however, that the relitigation issue is one question, while the issue
of whether the finding of fault for separation purposes will be
binding for article 160 alimony is another question altogether. Although the type of conduct required to fall within the limits of
article 138(3) and ultimately to invoke the remedy provided for in
article 141 may be quite minimal, the preclusion of a spouse in
need from permanent alimony should reflect, in the words of Judge
Beer, "totally abhorrent" conduct. 103 When two persons are involved in an unsatisfactory and perhaps agonizing personal relationship, it is extremely unlikely that either spouse can escape the
reach of a flexible culpability rule (if that consideration is at all
relevant in these circumstances). A finding of legal fault (which, in
101. See generally cases cited note 100 supra.
102. See, e.g., Laurent v. Laurent, 369 So. 2d 476 (La. App. 4th Cir.), writ refused, 371
So. 2d 1343 (La. 1979); DeFatta v. DeFatta, 352 So. 2d 287 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1977); Perez v.
Perez, 334 So. 2d 719 (La. App. 4th Cir.),.cert. denied, 338 So. 2d 700 (La. 1976); Schillaci v.
Schillaci, 339 So. 2d 532 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1976).
103. See notes 89-90 supra and accompanying text.
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effect, may have little to say about the conduct or the character of
the person) should not bar the spouse who is at a substantial
financial disadvantage from gaining some type of minimal support
for a period of time. This type of result is buttressed by the pragmatic consideration that the State would otherwise bear the
financial burden of such an outcome and also, more importantly,
by a basic sense of humanity and justice-not to speak of common
sense.
JUDICIAL CONSTRUCTION OF ARTICLE 141
The courts have construed the substance of article 141 without
directly resolving the question of whether it eliminates the doctrine of comparative rectitude. In Brocato v. Brocato,'04 a case decided in 1979, the court held that "it is [not] necessary for the trial
court to weigh the proportional wrongs of each party under the
doctrine of comparative rectitude." 05 The court reasoned that "[i]f
the fault of each party, equal or unequal, standing alone is sufficient to award the other a judgment of separation, then their respective fault is deemed to be mutual."' 06 The jurisprudence, then,
harmonizes perfectly with the express language of article 141;
neither source, however, addresses the question of the future status
of the doctrine of comparative rectitude and its implications upon
the permanent alimony determination. Is the fault determination
for separation purposes to be the same for permanent alimony
considerations?
THE OSTENSIBLE SCOPE OF ARTICLE 141
Article 141 provides that "[a] separation from bed and board
shall be granted although both spouses are mutually at fault in
104. 369 So. 2d 1083 (La. App. 1st Cir.), writ denied, 371 So. 2d 1341 (La. 1979).
105. Id. at 1086.
106. Id. Other recent decisions have held in the same vein: Post v. Post, 376 So. 2d
1275 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1979) (article 141 does not require a finding of equal degrees of fault
before a separation can be granted); Rittiner v. Sinclair, 374 So. 2d 680, 682 (La. App. 4th
Cir. 1979) ("only fault which' defeats a wife's entitlement to post-divorce alimony is fault
which is sufficient to constitute grounds within C.C. 138 for separation in favor of the husband."); Guin v. Guin, 378 So. 2d 1022, 1023 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1979) ("degree of fault necessary to warrant a separation under any of the provisions of Art. 138 has been defined as
'unjustifiable conduct on the part of either husband or wife which so grievously wounds
mental feelings of the other, or such as in any manner utterly destroys the legitimate ends
and objects of matrimony.' ") (quoting Krauss v. Krauss, 163 La. 218, 226, 111 So. 683, 685
(La. 1927)).
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causing the separation. In such instances, alimony pendente lite
may be allowed but permanent alimony shall not be allowed thereafter following divorce." It seems clear that the substance of article
141 was intended to apply to a rather classical situation. A typical
case would consist of the following circumstances: the fault of the
husband involves regular and violent physical cruelty to the wife as
well as verbal abuse and false accusations; the wife drinks and uses
drugs to excess, and often leaves the matrimonial domicile for extended periods of time, imposing her small children upon neighbors or relatives. In this case the conduct of each party obviously
would constitute independent grounds for separation under article
138 or would be considered a proximate cause of the separation
under any definition of fault. The fault not only is mutual, but it
appears to be equally grave on both sides. Pending professional
help, such a marriage probably should be dissolved for the good of
all involved, and it should make little difference whether the dissolution takes place upon the basis of fault or the mutual consent of
the parties.
Yet financially, the invoking of fault grounds obviously makes
a substantial difference. If one of the spouses is in a precarious
financial position and basically unable to support himself or herself
properly, he or she is unable to obtain any permanent alimony.
Although the basic rationale for such an outcome can be debated,
that is the result mandated by the express language of articles 141
and 160. '
JURISDICTIONAL PROBLEMS AND THE FAULT NOTION
Under the full faith and credit clause of the United States
Constitution, 10 8 the courts of a state have jurisdiction to adjudicate
a party's change of marital status if at least one of the parties to
the marriage is domiciled in that state. The celebrated Williams v.
North Carolina cases '0 9 held that the status established in such ex
107.
108.

LA. CIV. CODE ANN. arts. 141 & 160 (West Supp. 1982).
U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 1.

109. Williams v. North Carolina, 317 U.S. 287 (1942); Williams v. North Carolina, 325
U.S. 226 (1945). The holdings of these cases have been described as follows: in the first
Williams case, the Supreme Court held "that the ex parte decree of the state of one
spouse's domicil must be recognized throughout the nation by force of the Constitution." In
the second Williams case, "the Court held that, while the state of a spouse's domicil has the
power to grant a divorce entitled to full faith and credit, the issue whether either spouse
was, in fact, domiciled in the state of divorce is open for reexamination." W. WADLINGTON &
M. PAULSEN, DOMESTIC RELATIONS 414-15 (1978).
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parte divorce proceedings involving a domiciliary was valid in all
sister states;" ° the Estin v. Estin'" and Vanderbilt v. Vanderbilt 1 2 decisions, however, qualified the interstate impact of such
proceedings by limiting the res judicata effect to the status question and refusing to extend it to alimony, property and other incidents of the relationship. Accordingly, under established principles, a divorce decree'rendered by a sister state-for purposes of
full faith and credit-is divisible:" 3 the status determination is
severable from the ruling on alimony and the financial consequences of the status change. In any event, since an alimony decision, like a custody ruling, is subject to modification (it is not a
final judgment), it is not entitled to full faith and credit." 4 Moreover, in light of the fact that an alimony award is a money judgment, the court must have personal jurisdiction over the defendant
5
to render a valid judgment."
Article 160, at first blush, seems to confirm the substance of
these well-established principles; it provides, in relevant part, that
"[a]limony shall not be denied on the ground that one spouse obtained a valid divorce from the other spouse in a court of another
state or country which had no jurisdiction over the person of the
claimant spouse.""' Under this language it is clear that an alimony
judgment rendered by a sister-state jurisdiction against a Louisiana resident will not be given full faith and credit in Louisiana
unless the rendering court had personal jurisdiction over the Louisiana resident. A problem arises, however, in this regard due to the
article 160 requirement that a spouse seeking alimony be free from
fault.
Assume that one of the spouses to a marriage contracted and
performed in Louisiana leaves the state, establishes a bona fide
domicile in a sister jurisdiction, and sues the other spouse for divorce in that jurisdiction on the basis of the absent spouse's fault.
The litigation proceeds normally and results in a judgment of divorce based upon the absent spouse's fault, say adultery. There is
no mention in the decree of an alimony determination-we may
110. Id.
111.
112.
113.
derbilt v.
114.
115.
116.

334 U.S. 541 (1948).
354 U.S. 416 (1957).
See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS, §§ 6, 109 (1971). See also VanVanderbilt, 354 U.S. 416 (1957).
See id. Accord Worthley v. Worthley, 44 Cal. 2d 465, 283 P.2d 19. (1955).
See note 113 supra and accompanying text.
LA. CIv. CODE ANN. art. 160 (West Supp. 1982).
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assume that the court in the sister state held that it could not rule
on that matter because it did not have personal jurisdiction over
the absent spouse. The migratory spouse returns to Louisiana and
petitions a state court to have the divorce judgment recognized on
the basis of full faith and credit. Unless the other spouse can prove
that the migratory spouse did not obtain a valid domicile in the
sister state, the status change will have to be recognized in Louisiana-the marriage will be considered as legally dissolved.
A problem arises as to the fault determination that was
reached under the status judgment. Remember that the migratory
spouse obtained a divorce based upon the Louisiana spouse's fault
(a fault which appears in the enumeration of articles 138 and 139).
Under the divisibility doctrine, a state is required to give full faith
and credit only to the status part of a sister state divorce decree;
the financial incidents of the status change are severable and not
entitled to full faith and credit. In the hypothetical example, no
alimony determination was made, but the status change was effectuated upon the basis of fault. There is, therefore, a type of cause
and effect relationship that applies-almost by definition -between the change of status and the reasons for which that change
was made.
If the status determination is to be afforded full faith and
credit, the latter extends to the entire status judgment, i.e., the
actual change and the reasons for it. As a consequence, if the Louisiana spouse were to file for alimony, that spouse-in theory at
least-would be refused alimony because the divorce was granted
upon the basis of his or her fault. If the previously quoted language of article 160 was meant to integrate the divisibility doctrine
into the substance of the Code, it, however, does not apply here.
The problem is outside the divisibility issue. The Louisiana spouse
would be denied alimony not because a sister jurisdiction so adjudicated, but rather because Louisiana law, which applies to the alimony determination, premises all alimony determinations first on
the basis of fault.
In terms of theory, the possibility of such a result raises questions about the full faith and credit doctrine. That doctrine is,
however, constitutionally mandated. More importantly, the possible result illustrates the serious disadvantages that flow from the
strict and unbending commitment of the Code to the fault concept
in the alimony area. It is eminently conceivable that the Louisiana
courts would, in practice, simply declare that a sister-state judg-
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ment cannot impinge in any way upon the alimony determination
or deploy a floating fault calculus or similar idea in these circumstances. The mere fact that such a problem can arise in purely theoretical terms, however, is enough to have the fault scheme reconsidered as a viable mechanism by which to transfer wealth upon
the permanent dissolution of marriage.
THE ROLE OF FAULT RECONSIDERED
How much will be sacrificed to preserve the sanctity of fault?
One codal provision views marriage as a secular institution-a civil
contract to which the ordinary principles of contract law apply.
Given the fundamental importance of marriage and the family in
society, however, the principle of individual autonomy in contractual matters must be tempered by public policy considerations.
The State has a right, even a duty, to foster the stability of marriages and the family in the community. A quasi-ecclesiastic heritage would extend the regulatory authority of the State to its outer
limits and eradicate the notion of individual autonomy to promote
the view that marriage, no matter how agonizing for and destructive of the individuals involved, is essentially an indissoluble bond.
Under this view as reinterpreted for more secular purposes, divorce
can be had only by alleging odious conduct and engaging in a
painstaking procedural process.
Despite attempts to attenuate the fault ideology, the Louisiana Civil Code, as a document proclaiming the guiding principles
of the Louisiana juridical order, remains unequivocally committed
to fault-based separation and divorce. The substantive provisions
which articulate more contemporary mores and notions of the marriage relationship occupy a distinctively secondary status in the
body of the Code. The nonfault mutual consent grounds for separation and ultimately divorce are attached to the end of a long list
of the traditional fault grounds, and there appears to be some confusion about the respective statutory periods of de facto separation
that will permit mutual consent separation. The advances achieved
by article 141 in terms of recrimination are muted when the ugly
specter of fault raises its head to supervise the financial consequences of divorce based upon mutual fault. The substance of article 160 is perhaps the chief spokesman for the dominance of the
fault ideology-the absolutist answer to relative and varying
human predicaments. No matter what the need, no matter what
the public fiscal consequence, a spouse who has been at fault, mini-
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mally or otherwise, cannot be granted alimony. All this adhered to
apparently in the name of maintaining the institution of the family, but to the neglect of vital human considerations which are at
the very heart of the family unit.
Marriage comprises all the human expectations that accompany love and the birth of children, expectations which sometimes
are frustrated and disappointed for many reasons. In legal terms,
the definition of marriage is stated in less emotional and more conceptual terms, although the words which articulate the idea have
the strongest impact upon the most deeply felt emotions. In Book I
of the Louisiana Civil Code, there seem to be two not entirely harmonious definitions of marriage: One is that it is a civil contract,
which recognizes unmistakably the possibility of divorce, giving expression to individual autonomy and responsibility, and the other,
perhaps dispositive, view is that marriage is a nearly indissoluble
union which, for reasons, imagined or otherwise, of social policy or
ideological baggage, can be dissolved principally upon the basis of
egregious wrongful conduct for which the actor in question must be
punished. The very structure of article 138, although it does not
create an explicit ordering among the fault grounds, gives primacy
to the notion of fault. The civil character of marriage seems to
predominate at its inception-it is easy to get married, while the
less secular concept and the notion of State-imposed regulation appear to govern its dissolution.
People enter into all sorts of contractual relationships with expectations that become frustrated; once a failure to perform or a
defective performance is established, the question is raised: Which
party is responsible for the breach? Marriage is a special type of
contractual agreement which, of course, can be breached in many
ways. The principal element of the bargain is an exchange, a mutual giving of personalities in the hope that the circumstances of
life will allow them to be compatible. At the moment of marriage,
positive expectations are high and the old myth of the androgyne
stands forth in its strongest form. The risk factor, however, also
can be substantial; impressionistic views can be rendered even
more superficial by strong emotions. The decision to live with another person involves accepting a character and history that will
become fully apparent only through time. Moreover, the fact that a
young adult marries does not eliminate his or her potential for
growth-people can change and perhaps should change with the
lessons of experience. All this to say that a breach of this special
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contract is more a reflection of the evolution of the life processes
and a determination that the potential projected harmony between
two personalities was simply a mutual miscalculation. In some, if
not most, cases of separation and divorce, the alleged fault is no
more than a symptom of a basic clash of personalities. In this sort
of equation, the culpability factor is a mere artifice; although the
term irreconciliable differences may appear to be a frivolous catchall phrase, expressing the State's abdication of its responsibilities,
it is perhaps the most accurate representation of what actually
happens when a marriage fails. The root cause of the problem is a
basic and fundamental inability of the spouses to'get along because
of their differences in character and personality. This attitude towards divorce appears to have been adopted in Louisiana with considerable circumspection; indeed, it is the last ground under article
138. It is submitted that the psychological reality of marital breakdowns should be afforded greater prominence in the legal regulation of separation and divorce in Louisiana.
What are the specifically juristic problems with the present
provisions governing the termination of marriage and what solutions can be proposed? There is clearly some doctrinal inconsistency between the position taken in article 86 that marriage is a
civil contract and the heavy emphasis placed upon fault in articles
138, 139, 141 and 160. In terms of the structure of the Code, simply
tagging on mutual consent grounds at the end of the article 138
enumeration is not a particularly felicitous method to integrate
changes of social ideology into the Code. The piecemeal reassessment and modification of Book I has created glaring inconsistencies and unwarranted confusion. In the final analysis, it is an unsatisfactory approach by which to deal with the substance of a
document that is to act as the juridical beacon for Louisiana's legal
system and unique civilian culture. In these circumstances, it is
necessary to recall Professors Spaht and Shaw's description of
Book I and its desired structural harmony:
Book I of the Louisiana Civil Code, entitled "Of Persons" and containing a highly ordered system for the regulation of family life,
shares with other branches of our private law the harmonious structure that is the hallmark of a civil law system. Because of its
smoothly articulated structure, the codal scheme, the product of the
thought and experience of many generations of legal scholars and
administrators, is highly vulnerable to untoward tinkering with its
several parts. A change in detail may signal a restructuring of the
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whole."'
The enactment of article 138(9) and (10) was more than a
change in detail; it represented a challenge to a formerly unquestioned ideology of fault in matters of separation and divorce. This
is the course of action that has been adopted by several civilian
jurisdictions in the recent past, most notably, France. Although
this liberalizing measure may have had a substantial impact in
practice, its implementation into the substance of Book I was
somewhat disguised and hesitant, provoking disorientation in the
basic ideological orientation of the Code in the area of Persons.
The ambiguity of the status of mutual consent separation and divorce became especially pronounced when the fault barrier to alimony determinations remained intact. It is a well-settled rule of
Louisiana law that, while fault is irrelevant in a proceeding for separation based upon mutual consent, the fault question can be litigated when alimony is requested in a divorce action based upon
mutual consent. 118 The status change can be made without any reference to fault, but the determination of the financial consequences of divorce, in the absence of an agreement on this matter
by the parties approved by a court, cannot take place without a
fault determination. The mutual consent notion has had no impact
upon the alimony provisions.
A possible remedy to the fundamental disharmony occasioned
in the fabric of the Code by the incorporation of the mutual consent concept would be to rely upon the courts to exercise their discretion in these matters and to manipulate the codal provisions so
as to avoid their unsalutary effects. The notion of a floating fault
calculus buttressed by the doctrine of comparative rectitude and
the notion of fault as a proximate causative factor might constitute
a judicially articulated and applied solution. In systemic terms,
however, especially in a civilian jurisdiction, judicial artifice-no
matter how astute-does not appear to be the most propitious solution. The Louisiana Civil Code has a distinguished history and
occupies a position of cardinal importance in Louisiana's legal system and culture. Its provisions on the law of Persons deserve bet117. Spaht & Shaw, note 46 supra.
118. See, e.g., Laurent v. Laurent, 369 So. 2d 476 (La. App. 4th Cir.), writ denied, 371
So. 2d 1343 (La. 1979); DeFatta v. DeFatta, 352 So. 2d 287 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1977); Moon v.
Moon, 345 So. 2d 168 (La. App. 3d Cir.), cert. denied, 347 So. 2d 250 (La. 1977); Schillaci v.
Schillaci, 339 So. 2d 532 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1976). See also Wagner v. Wagner, 248 So. 2d 96
(La. App. 4th Cir. 1971); LA. CODE CiV. PRO. ANN. art. 3946(C) (West 1979).
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ter than piecemeal attention which leaves the Code dressed in incongruity rather than clarity. Many of the codal articles reflect a
historical affinity with the French legal system and its codification;
they thereby continue to translate a nineteenth century view of the
family, an institution which has undergone a metamorphosis in the
twentieth century. Yet, in the last decade, the French Parliament
restructured altogether the French law on Persons.' " Louisiana's
attachment to other civilian jurisdictions should not remain a
purely historical phenomenon, but rather a source of inspiration
and cooperation leading to the elaboration of legal rules and principles which heed the lessons of the past, are mindful of the future,
and respond to the continuing social mutations of the present.
Using the 1975 French law on divorce as a stepping stone, it is
submitted that, in order to achieve the substantive and structural
harmony which must be an attribute of the Louisiana Civil Code if
it is to survive as the fundamental legal document of a United
States jurisdiction, the grounds for separation and divorce be
merged into one article which would order the grounds in terms of
their importance: first, in terms of mutual consent and de facto
separation of the spouses and, then, in the exceptional case, in
terms of the traditional fault motive for separation and divorce.
The fault grounds would not be enumerated expressly in order to
rid the law of the image that it provides a means by which disappointed and disillusioned spouses can vent their anger and bitterness upon one another. In this way, the Code would convey, forcefully and unmistakably, the view that marriage is a civil contract
in which the will of the partners is constrained by only the most
necessary regulatory provisions. The permissible restraints that
might be imposed upon the litigants are a mandatory period of reflection and the duty of the court to remind them that their actions will have a considerable impact upon their future lives. Realistically, and in terms of the legitimate exercise of its regulatory
authority, the State should do no more than this. It cannot select a
spouse for one of its citizens nor should it try to coerce him or her
to remain with a person with whom satisfactory personal communication no longer is possible. If the State occupies any role in this
process, it should be to assist the spouses to resolve their infelicitous union through an amicable settlement rather than to vent
their frustrations through the legal process.
119. See note 79 supra and accompanying text.
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Obviously, such a substantial modification of the grounds for
separation and divorce would entail an equally considerable and
necessary reformulation of the alimony formula. It is submitted
that the concept of fault in this area carries with it a punitive rationale that has become totally incongruent with the evolving state
of society. Traditionally, Louisiana law has distinguished between
alimony pendente lite and permanent alimony.12 0 The former is
granted during the separation proceeding and until a divorce decree issues, and is based solely upon the need of the spouse who
"has not. a sufficient income for maintenance";12 ' the latter is
awarded to a spouse upon divorce, and is based first upon a fault
determination and, if the spouse requesting alimony is free from
fault, then upon a need determination. 2 ' Alimony pendente lite
does not involve a fault component and has no ceiling (except that
it is granted in proportion to need and means),1' 2' but permanent
alimony is premised upon nonculpable conduct and has a maximum "which shall not exceed one-third" of the liable spouse's income.' 2 4 Alimony pendente lite has a public policy character and
cannot be waived by the agreement of the parties,'2 5 while permanent alimony-according to recent decisional law-is not a
mandatory feature of the law and can be waived by private
26
agreement.'
There is a doctrinal justification for this distinction. Alimony
pendente lite reflects the continuing obligation of support between
the spouses under article 119; a legal separation, while it dissolves
the community property regime and eliminates the duty of conjugal cohabitation under article 120, does not undo the mutual duties
27
of husband and wife under article 119-one of which is support.'
Permanent alimony, however, is granted after the bond of marriage
has been completely dissolved. It is not anchored in the obligations
outlined in any codal article. It is, according to the characterization
of the decisional law, a "gratuity.' ' 2 8 Fault is a dispositive first
hurdle in a permanent alimony determination because it relates di120.
121.
122.
123.

LA. CIV. CODE ANN. arts. 148 & 160 (West Supp. 1982).
Id. art. 148.
Id. art. 160.
Id. art. 148.

124.
125.
126.

Id. art. 160.
See Holliday v. Holliday, 358 So. 2d 618 (La. 1978).
See Monk v. Monk, 376 So. 2d 552 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1979).

127.

See, e.g., Liles v. Liles, 369 So. 2d 479 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1979).

128. See, e.g., Latour v. Guilbeau, 256 So. 2d 731 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1972); McMath v.
Masters, 198 So. 2d 734 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1967).
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rectly to why the marriage bond was dissolved, whereas need becomes the primary and exclusive factor in alimony pendente lite
even though the separation may be or has been granted upon the
basis of the benefited spouse's fault because the article 119 obligations remain intact.
In terms of doctrine, the distinction between alimony
pendente lite and permanent alimony is well-articulated, although
in a civilian jurisdiction with a strong sense of public policy it is
difficult, despite the technical persuasiveness of the reasoning, to
understand why permanent alimony has no public policy character
while alimony pendente lite does. Moreover, this technical distinction discounts, even disregards, the impact of legal construction
and rules upon the litigants. If the concepts of marriage and divorce are to be articulated primarily in terms of mutual consent,
the notion of fault has little, if any, place in alimony determinations. If the legal system is to continue to function as an instrument of justice, it cannot refuse to respond to the practical impact
of its rules upon the litigants and the community as a whole. If
marriages fail because initial assessments of personality and character were wrong on both sides, and culpable conduct is seen as a
symptom of a more fundamental problem, then the financial consequences of divorce should be assessed on a morally and legally
neutral ground-namely, that of need. Much like the child custody
issue addressed in article 146, the question of permanent alimony
should be determined equitably in accordance with the best interests of the parties involved. It has been argued by one distinguished legal scholar that the concept of alimony that should take
hold in Louisiana is the one termed "rehabilitative alimony,

' 12 9

an

equitable sum of money granted to the spouse in need for a fixed
period of time allowing him or her to fashion a new lifestyle.
Clearly, this is the type of notion that would fit in perfectly with
separation and divorce granted on the basis of mutual consent.
129. See Spaht, Persons, The Work of the Louisiana Appellate Courts for the 19791980 Term-A Faculty Symposium, 41 LA. L. REv. 372 (1981). In the 1981 session Senator
Nelson introduced a bill which provided that alimony be rendered upon the basis of need
alone. On June 3, 1981, the bill passed the Senate Committee and the Senate floor. Under
the provisions of the Nelson Bill, alimony is granted to a spouse in need considering his or
her earning capacity, provided the claimant spouse has not committed adultery. There is a
five year maximum period for granting alimony. The bill now is being considered by the
House Committee. I am indebted to Ms. Margaret Groome, a law student at Tulane Law
School, for the press reports, dated April 29, 1981, on this development. The bill was defeated in the 1981 session. Senator Nelson, however, indicated that he is considering reintroducing a similar provision in 1982.
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THE LEGITIMACY ISSUE
There are a number of minor, although not totally insignificant, semantic issues which arise from a reading of the chapters of
Book I which relate to the status of children. For example, while
article 27 defines legitimate children as "those who are born of a
marriage lawfully contracted,"130 and illegitimate children as "such
as are born of an illicit union," 13 ' article 179 contains a less precise,
potentially ambiguous, definition. Article 179 provides, in relevant
part, that "[]egitimate children are those who are either born or
conceived during marriage,' 3 2 leaving open the question of born or
conceived during the marriage of whom. Under one reading of the
codal language, one could conclude that a child is legitimate provided he is born while at least one of his biological parents is married to another person-a nonbiological parent. Such results have
been reached under the application of article 184,' but it is unlikely that the legislature intended to foster such ambiguity. To
some extent, the language of article 180 suffers from the same imprecision. A measure of clarity would be gained by modifying the
language of these articles to meet the standards set by article 27'18
and by article 198 which
speaks in terms of the "marriage of their
5
father and mother.''
Also, article 200,"1 which refers to legitimation by notarial act,
contains a rather unhappy transposition of the language of Act 391
of 1972.'3 7 The latter amended the article to permit legitimation by
either parent or both if they could marry each other either at the
conception of the child or at the time of the legitimation.""8 The
codal text reads in relevant part:
A father or mother shall have the power to legitimate his or her
illegitimate children by an act passed before a notary ... provided,

there exists at the time of conception or at the time of the legitimation of such children no legal impediment to the marriage of the
LA. CIv. CODE ANN. art. 27 (West 1952).
131. Id.
132. Id. art. 179 (West Supp. 1982).
133. See, e.g., Pascal, Who Is The Papa? (The Husband in Louisiana; the Paramour
in France), 18 LA. L. REV. 685 (1958).
134. See notes 130-131 supra and accompanying text.
135. LA. CiV. CODE ANN. art. 198 (West Supp. 1982).
136. Id. art. 200.
137. See R. PASCAL, supra note 4, at 328.
138. Id.
130.
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father and mother." 9
In complete contradistinction to the purpose of the 1972 Act, the
language of article 200 could be interpreted to mean that, in order
to legitimate a child by notarial act, no legal impediment to the
marriage of the father and mother could exist either at the time of
conception or at the time of legitimation. A reformulation of the
codal language to express unambiguously the intent of the 1972
Act would add clarity and promote the effort to liberalize and encourage legitimation.
At least prior to the recent reform of the legislation on legitimacy, the chief issue in this area of the law of Persons dealt with
the presumption of paternity articulated in article 184. The text of
article 184 reads the way it does in all other civilian jurisdictions
which subscribe to the pater is est presumption: "The husband of
the mother is presumed to be the father of all children born or
conceived during the marriage. ' '140 As such, the presumption of paternity does not raise any doctrinal or analytic problems. It is simply meant to respond to the biological fact that the paternity of a
man is more difficult to prove than a woman's maternity. It is
based upon the view that marriage is a legitimate institution that
will be disturbed only exceptionally by adultery and that children
born or conceived within the confines of marriage and given birth
by the wife are entitled to be considered as legitimate offsprings
(i.e., having the husband of their mother as their father) until the
contrary is proven by an action in disavowal. The article establishes, on its face, a rebuttable presumption of paternity against
the husband of the mother.
According to Professor Pascal, the French courts have applied
and interpreted the presumption of paternity in the way in which
it was intended-merely as a rebuttable presumption. 141 When the
facts contradicted and, in effect, defeated the presumption, the
child was considered illegitimate (born of an illicit union)."2' At
least prior to 1976, the Louisiana decisional law in many instances
did not share this view of the function of the pater is est presumption, construing it at times as an irrebuttable presumption of paternity. " 3 Although it led to the most unfortunate results, the Lou139.
140.
141.
142.
143.

Supp. 1982).
Id. art. 184.
See note 133 supra and accompanying text.
Id.
See, e.g., Spaht & Shaw, note 46 supra.
LA. CIv. CODE ANN. art. 200 (West
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isiana courts considered the article 184 presumption to be an
instrument by which to confer the status of legitimacy upon children born of the wife's relationship with a man other than her
husband."

4

In Succession of Goss,'"5 a 1974 case, for example, the court

declared that it was the public policy of Louisiana to "insure that
the legitimacy of a child will be maintained whenever possible,
provide presumptions of the strictest nature, and protect helpless
children, born legitimate, from illegitimation by one or both of
their parents for their own selfish aims."" In effect, the presumption of paternity, in order to safeguard children, was deemed to be
"absolute and irrefutable," but for the action in disavowal which
almost never was successful." 7 According to Professor Spaht,
In order to protect children from the stigma of illegitimacy....
Louisiana courts have frequently related two persons in the fatherchild bond who could not possibly have a biological connection....
The presumption established in Article 184 was not intended to be
irrebuttable. Strict judicial interpretation of the causes of an action
en desaveu and severe limitations on the right to bring it have rendered the presumption practically irrebuttable. Application of the
presumption occasionally produces absurd results, but its inviolability has been favored as a protection to children individually and to
148
the family as a unit.

Professor Pascal draws the same conclusion:
For over a century the unwillingness to label a child an illegitimate
has led to decisions which imposed legitimate descent from the husband of the mother on children who never claimed him as father
and imposed paternity on husbands in situations in which no geneticist or layman would even suspect him of fatherhood in fact.14 '
In effect, for purposes of wrongful death and workmen's compensation actions, the Louisiana courts developed the categories of the
legitimate and the illegitimate father.150
144. Id.
145. 304 So. 2d 704 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1974), writ denied, 309 So. 2d 339 (La.), cert.
denied, 422 U.S. 869 (1975).
146. Id. at 708 (citations omitted).
147. Id. See also Tannehill v. Tannehill, 261 La. 933, 261 So. 2d 619 (1972) and Tannehill v. Tannehill, 226 So. 2d 185 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1969).
148. See note 143 supra and accompanying text.
149. Pascal, supra note 133, at 687-88.
150. See note 143 supra and accompanying text.
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Under the Louisiana decisional law prior to 1976, the presumption of paternity ceased to reflect the biological differences
between men and women and the evidentiary difficulties that were
associated with paternity. Rather, it became a convenient instrument by which to give expression to a public policy concern that
the status of illegitimacy be avoided at all possible costs. The
courts perceived the children born of an illicit union as the helpless and hapless victims of adult conduct-the unknowing thirdparty recipients of an ugly and unwanted stigma of social outcasts.
In their enthusiasm to rescue children from the legal, social and
psychological consequences of illegitimacy, the courts failed to perceive that the price of their humanitarianism was not being evenly
distributed throughout society-that, in fact, one class of persons
was being singled out to bear the costs of the campaign to eradicate the category of illegitimacy.
There was no reasonable equivalent to the article 184 presumption directed at wives until 1980.151 This provision, however,
was eliminated by 1981 legislation. 152 As long as the presumption
was used to compensate for evident and undeniable biological differences, no illegal discrimination upon the basis of sex could be
alleged. When the presumption became an instrument for conferring legitimate status upon children and ceased to serve its intended function, husbands were made to bear an onus because of
their sex. While a wife could have an affair and have the child born
of that illicit union declared to be the child of her husband, the
husband who had a child with a woman other than his wife could
not have that child declared to be the legitimate offspring of his
marriage. The costs of attributing the status of legitimacy to adulterine children (the net effect of attributing paternity despite evident biological fact to the contrary) were being borne exclusively
by married men. In light of the recent concern over sex discrimination issues in Louisiana, especially in the alimony area, 158 it is surprising that this patent form of gender-based discrimination went
unnoticed.154 While women might be outraged (and justifiably so)
at the idea of having a child that they did not bear declared to be
their legitimate offspring through the operation of law because of
151. 1980 La. Acts. No. 549, § 1 (amending LA. CIV. CODE ANN. art. 209).
152. 1981 La. Acts. No. 720 (codified at LA. CIV. CODE ANN. art. 209 (West Supp.
1982)).
153. See, e.g., Lovell v. Lovell, 378 So. 2d 418 (La. 1979).
154. For other commentaries upon article 184, see, e.g., Note, 40 LA. L. REV. 1024
(1980); Note, 3 So. U. L. REV. 102 (1976).
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their husband's extramiarital activity, this is what has been happening to men in Louisiana for many years. In their quest to uphold the interests of children, the courts seem to have forgotten
about the constitutional ramifications of their decisions, the rights
and interests of unmarried biological fathers, and especially the
rights of innocent husbands.
The sole remedy in these circumstances might have been to
have article 184 amended to read explicitly that it was not an irrebuttable presumption, to have it declared unconstitutional under
the Louisiana Constitution as interpreted by the decisional law, or
to enact a similar provision applying to women and maternity. The
recent legislative reform of the legitimacy provisions, begun in
1976, may have rendered such action unnecessary. Although the
presumption of paternity appears in its traditional formulation, article 186 states a countervailing presumption which can defeat the
application of artic1 184. Article 186 states that "[tihe husband of
the mother is not presumed to be the father of the child if another
man is presumed to be the father."15 This language at least is an
indication that the article 184 presumption is not and should not
be interpreted as an irrebuttable presumption. The contrary presumption referred to in article 186 seemed to be contained in Civil
Code article 209 relating to proof of filiation which, prior to its
recent amendment, provided that "[e]vidence, that the mother and
alleged father were known as living in a state of concubinage and
resided as such at the time when the child was conceived creates a
rebuttable presumption of filiation between the child and the alleged father." '5 6 The 1981 legislation, however, abrogated this language and eliminated, without replacing it, this possible countervailing presumption to the article 184 presumption.1 57 As a result
of this modification, it is indeed difficult, if not impossible, to find
any language supporting the substance of article 186. The severe
restrictions on the action of disavowal, however, appear to have
been relaxed somewhat, 15 8 indicating that the interpretation of article 184 as an irrebuttable presumption is unwarranted. Finally, if
articles 198 and 199 dealing with the legitimation of children by
the subsequent marriage of their biological parents and the repeal
of the ban against the legitimation of adulterine children are to
155.
156.
157.
158.

LA. CIv. CODE ANN. art.

186 (West Supp. 1982).

1980 La. Acts No. 549, § 1 (amending LA. Civ. CODE ANN. art. 209).
1981 La. Acts No. 720 (codified at LA. CIV. CODE ANN. art 209 (West Supp. 1982)).
LA. CIv. CODE ANN. arts. 187-190 (West Supp. 1982).
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have any meaning, 159 the article 184 presumption cannot be interpreted as being irrebuttable.
Although this examination of the recent legislation on legitimacy is no more than a cursory overview, it does illustrate a liberalizing trend in this area that attempts to accommodate the interests of all the parties involved. All of these considerations,
however, may become irrelevant in light of the decision in Succession of Brown, 60 a case decided by the Louisiana Supreme Court
in September 1980 which declared article 919 unconstitutional and
which led to the sweeping changes made by the 1981 legislature in
Title I of Book III of the Civil Code."'
Prior to Brown, a series of United States Supreme Court decisions had whittled away at the discriminatory legislation aimed at
illegitimate children, leaving inheritance, under the Labine v. Vincent'6 2 decision in 1971, as the only area in which the status of
illegitimacy could result in different treatment. In Trimble v.
Gordon,6 " decided in 1977, the Court disregarded two of the three
state interests in the unequal treatment of illegitimate children,
namely, the promotion of legitimate family relationships and the
options that a parent could exercise to insure an illegitimate child
a portion of his estate. 64 In Brown the Louisiana Supreme Court
effectively rejected the third state interest, i.e., the orderly disposition of property upon death. " If the consequences of Brown are as
radical as they appear to be, there seems to be little reason to
maintain the codal provisions on legitimacy in Book I, since the
legal status of legitimacy and illegitimacy will be devoid of any legal consequences. It is quite clear that article 206166 will become
meaningless if Brown is given its full impact in the Code. The
center of attention, then, may be shifted from problems of illegiti67
macy to those of acknowledgement and proving filiation.1
159. Id. arts. 198 & 199.
160. 388 So. 2d 1151 (La. 1980), cert. denied, 450 U.S. 998 (1981). See Note, 27 Loy.
L. REV. 237 (1981).
161. 1981 La. Acts No. 919 (codified in scattered articles of the Civil Code).
162. 401 U.S. 532 (1971).
163. 430 U.S. 762 (1977).
164. Id.
165. See note 160 supra and accompanying text.
166. LA. CIv. CODE ANN. art. 206 (West Supp. 1982).
167. There are a number of other aspects of Book I which deserve at least some brief
mention in this analytic survey of the codal texts. When compared to its counterparts in the
French Code, C. civ. 343-370, Louisiana Civil Code article 214, dealing with adoption, is
somewhat curious since it does not establish any distinction between simple and plenary
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CONCLUSIONS

The most evident conclusion that can be drawn from this admittedly selective consideration of Book I of the Louisiana Civil
Code is that there is an undeniable and pressing need for a comprehensive reassessment of the substance of the codal provisions.
Louisiana is a civilian (to some extent, a hybrid and sui generis)
jurisdiction which is rightly proud of its juridical heritage and culture. If that tradition is to be perpetuated intact and unsoiled, it
must be revitalized as it has been by the lucid revision and amendment of Book II and the revamping of some parts of Book III. The
area of Persons is indispensable to the organic unity of the Code,
and it is an area of litigation in which the social mutations perhaps
are strongest, the most radical and the quickest to take place. The
issues of palimony, surrogate parenthood and artificial insemination are on the horizon, and the subject of litigation in a number of
states. 68 It is inconceivable that, in a civilian jurisdiction, the legal
document that contains the guiding principles of the legal order
should be riddled with so many inconsistencies, potential and actual ambiguities, semantic imprecisions, and in some cases an ideology relating to fundamental social institutions which is but a
shadow of a tradition that was outpaced many years ago by the
dynamics of social evolution.
Without presuming to enter into a debate with two eminent
legal scholars, 16 9 the French civilian tradition was at least a source
of inspiration for the drafters of the Louisiana Civil Code of 1808.
In some instances the French doctrinal writings and judicial opinions still have some relevance to legal interpretation and judicial
determinations in Louisiana. During the last decade, the signifiadoption. Under Louisiana law adoption represents a complete severance of ties between the

adoptee and his natural family and a reinstatement of that relationship with the adoptive
family but for maintaining the adoptee's inheritance rights in his natural family. The failure
to establish this familiar distinction and the threat that anything but a total severance can
have upon the process of adoption appears to be an anomaly in the Code. Also, it is somewhat incongruous to read the title of Chapter 5 as "Of Paternal Authority," and to have the
provisions which appear under that chapter to be phrased in terms of parental authority.
The problems associated with tutorship (i.e., splitting it and custody) and the liability for
the delictual acts of children are all beyond the consideration of this textual survey.
168. See, e.g., W. WADLINGTON & M. PAULSEN, DOMESTIC RELATIONS 682-90 (1978);
Castillo, Judges Flip the Family Album, N.Y. Times, May 3, 1981, § 4, at E9, col. 1; Whose
Baby Is It, Anyway? NEWSWEEK, Apr. 6, 1981, at 83; Griffin, Surrogate Mothers, STUDENT
LAWYER, Apr. 1981, at 29.
169. I am referring to the debate between Professors Batiza and Pascal concerning the
sources of the Louisiana Civil Code.
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cant date being 1975, the French completely revised their codal
provisions relating to the law of Persons. While the French experience is not perfect and can be subject to some strong doctrinal
criticism, it can and should serve as a stepping stone for a similar
Louisiana revision in this area. Louisiana's unique stature in the
United States and the world can only be enhanced by developing
its civilian bonds and comparative reference to other legal cultures.
In the last analysis, Book I, while it remains a workable legal document thanks to judicial supervision, is sorely in need of comprehensive reconsideration-the type of reconsideration exemplified
in the recent legitimacy legislation.

